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Introduction
The rapidly widening chasm between the outer reaches of our technical capabilities and the usual mode of professional conduct within
medicine tends to place the efforts of medical personnel in the shadows. As professionals, they are keenly aware of the potential latent in
research and in its technical implementation for alleviating the distress
of numerous persons throughout the world. Yet their normal medical
procedures seem to amount to a curtailment of the relief and overall
contribution they might bring to the well-being of these people. The
obvious difference between promise and delivery is a painful perception in a profession dedicated to physical and psychic health and
integrity.
It is against this background that the following remarks are offered,
in acknowledgement of the marvelous achievements continuously
associated with present technology, while insisting on the excellence
of competently performed patient care, on a day-by-day basis. For I
intend to introduce a comparison between technology, genetics (and
eugenics) and the medical profession. My initial concern is with the
theological and ethical implications of genetic engineering.
I. Technology as Power

Technology is a kind of power, for it is the use of science in a
practical way to achieve sophisticated results for the benefit of large
numbers of people) Unlike pure science, often referred to as research,
where knowledge alone is the primary concern, technology is pragmatic in its orientation to use scientific discoveries for the benefit of
those to whom it is applied. In accomplishing this it touches many
people, as in the classical example of the atom and the change it
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underwent from being researched to being used for military and industrial purposes.
Because technology is oriented to use, it deploys large amounts of
energy and force , and assumes the guise of power . In this capacity it
elicits the question that power always evokes from ethics: is it GOOD
to use technology? 2 This question nettles those committed to technology, but unfortunately, it must always be put to the emergence of
power because of its liability to abuse. Our dawning awareness of
atomic fall-out has alerted us to the gamut of concerns that we have
come to call ecological.
There is undoubtedly a bias in ethics against power, in all its guises.
This is especially true of theological ethics , with its concern about sin.
The more directly the power of technology touches the quality of
human life, the keener the ethical concern with its use. Ethics seeks to
keep focus on the principle that technology must serve human life .
This is especially difficult to abide by, when experimental procedures
are being explored, with whatever degree of error or unpredictability
remains as a potential danger to human life.
This is why responsibility recommends itself in the use of power.
Responsibility is a kind of moral ecology that would filter out the use
of a power associated with technology by monitoring and controlling
its consequences within the criteria flowing from an ethical appreciation of life. 3 Responsibility is a moral imperative that grows in proportion to the power in question. In the case of technology, this
growth becomes exponential because of size, amounts, and numbers.
Some imperative questions beg to be answered: how much power is
involved? Does it promise to improve our future (making life mQre
livable)? Does its unlimited growth eventually entail diminishing
returns for our well-being, as ecological pollution is accelerated?
II. Genetics, Eugenics and Technology

The field of genetics illustrates the function of technology, when it
is applied by means of eugenics. Genetics is the study of inherited
traits carried by genes and chromosomes. It originated with the
Augustinian monk, Gregor Mendel, in the last century. Molecular
biology4 is continuing this study of our genetic packaging. It scored a
triumph in 1953 when two English scientists , James Watson and
Francis Crick, unlocked the precise functioning of DNA in heredity.
This opened the way to control genes in a variety of new ways, such as
improving the capacity of soil micro-organisms to "fix" nitrogen from
air. Recently, in California, a young researcher named John Marrow
developed highly reliable techniques for transferring foreign genes into
rapidly multiplying bacteria.
In these ways the science of genetics has gradually given rise to the
technology of eugenics, "a collection of policies designed to improve
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the genetic well-being of our species."5 Eugenics is an instance of
power because it applies the laws of heredity to the human race . It is a
term of Greek derivation meaning " well-born." It is designed to
improve not just one or other of us, but all of us, changing us for the
better by weeding out biological components of an undesirable nature.
Aggressiveness and propensity for violence are often cited as instances
of a highly undesirable trait that is liable to be magnified within the
crowded living conditions of our urban centers.6 Genetic engineering
is suggested as a m eans of factoring out these qualities. Some criminally inclined males seem to be distinguishable in their genetic composition, having an extra "y" chromosome. 7 They seem to be candidates for genetic manipulation, similar to that used by the Nazis in
Hitler's Germany against the " undesirable " traits in the Jews when, in
the name of Aryan-stock purity , they implemented a eugenic policy
that exterminated six million Jews, providing an unforgettable
instance of eugenics as power.
Any critique of eugenics, however , should acknowledge its stated
intent of improving the human race. This aim simply reenforces t he
process of natural selectionS already at work, for we have evolved to
our present conditions by means of a relatively "free mate" selection
that has accounted for whatever pro gress we have achieved. Through a
combination of free intermingling and controlled patterns of intermarriage , the gene pool which is the co mmon property of the race has
been enriched and /or tainted. 9 This process provides us an everexpanding potential of new genetic relationships, with a seemingly
infinite capacity to adjust and adapt to changing conditions of life . We
evidence our awareness of this when we observe that "no two people
are alike." Such variety is a primary trait of natural selection.

1. The General Problem Confronting Eugenics
But all is not well with this pro cess . Disease is as much a part of
genetic inheritance as health . The gene pool is tainted. It is estimated
that 250,000 defective infants are born annually in the United
States,10 many of these victims of inherited disease . Another estimate
conjectures that 25 percent of those admitted to one large metropolitan hospital are suffering from gene-caused or influenced disease. 11 We also have reason to believe that many miscarriages result
from the defective condition of the conceptus, and in other cases,
sterility is nature's defense against carriers of genetic disease . 12
Eugenics purports to deal with this situation. Its endeavor has come
to be distinguished into positive and negative aspects. The concern of
negative eugenics is genetic disease, which it seeks to eliminate or at
least modify as a factor in the gene pool. Positive eugenics is more
ambitious in its program of introducing desirable genetic traits into
February , 1980
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the race. 13 More consensus is attainable for legitimating the former
than the latter endeavor. This corresponds to our inclination to more
readily agree about what is "wrong" with us than about what is
"good" for us. 14
Each type of eugenics presently focuses on "monogenic" traits, that
is, inherited qualities associated with one gene only.l5 But as a matter
of fact, many inherited traits are polygenic in structure,16 that is,
they are interrelated with several genetic components. As a result,
eugenics currently operates within a limited framework, though much
of the literature devoted to it is future-oriented in its sweeping vision
of what eugenics might do. Rene Dubos, among others, repudiates this
exclusively biological interpretation of heredity, maintaining that it is
also influenced by environment as an actualizing agent of dormant
human potential. 17
2. A Specific Genetic Disorder
Two common genetic diseases are Tay-Sachs and sickle-cell anemia.
Much suffering is in store for the child afflicted with Tay-Sachs. 18 It
is the ambition of negative eugenics to eliminate this disease, but
procedures such as genetic surgery, which would repair the defective
gene in question, are still in the future.l 9 If completely successful,
such procedures would not only cure the child, but eliminate his
condition as a carrier of the disease. If every such child were submitted to treatment, all carriers would be "cured" and the disease
would be eliminated - but by a tedious process. Realistically, negative
eugenics is presently restricted to other measures. In the instance of
Tay-Sachs disease, cautious mate selection is recommended to prevent
two carriers, usually found among the Ashkenazi Jews, from marrying
one another. Marriage with a Sephardic Jew is advised. 20 But if this
seems unreasonable or unwarranted, then effective contraceptive
measures are urged. If such couples strongly desire children, adoption
is available. In these ways an effective negative eugenics is achieved,
preventing the defective traits from entering the gene pool. They are
certainly preferable to therapeutic abortion.
3. Responding to the Problems
Such procedures suppose, of course, an awareness that a eugenic
problem is threatening. There are ways of ascertaining this by learning
one's status as a carrier. One method is after the fact of pregnancy,
and involves amniocentesis whereby the amniotic sac is punctured so
that the fluid can be withdrawn and examined for traces of disease.'21
Genetic counseling should accompany this procedure, for a difficult
decision has to be reached by parents who learn that they have begot-
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ten a defective offspring. The issue emerges of what kind of counseling
is appropriate in this case: how directive it should be. Normally such
guidance should be indirect, seeking to facilitate, enable and support
the parents to reach a decision that corresponds to their convictions,
strengths, needs and condition. The counselor should not advise primarily with eugenic purposes (the needs of the race) in mind. 22 This
is a debatable position because it juxtaposes individual rights (fetus,
parents) and the welfare of the race. 23 In this "conflict," which side is
to prevail? Though some weight accrues to arguments favoring the
common welfare of the race from such customary practices as curtailing individual rights in instances of quarantine , vaccination and
venereal disease information,24 a certain proportion is achieved in
these cases between the relatively limited curtailment of the individual
and the significant advantage gained for large numbers of people. Such
proportion is not as evident in a genetic counseling situation where
infringement on the rights of individuals may be considerably more
substantial.
Concern for the betterment of the race through purifying the gene
pool of hereditary defects, or enriching it with a battery of desirable
traits, is a risky proposal. In the process of weeding out aggressiveness,
for instance, on the score of its social undesirability, something essential for human survival may be lost, that is, certain genetic qualities
required for courage. 25 This risk is aggravated in the case of positive
eugenics as it purports to fashion a desirable image of man /woman,
even setting aside the lack of consensus on just what such desirability
involves. Nevertheless, the attempt has been made, after a fashion, in
the practice of polygamy, where one man (whose status as a genetically superior individual is not implausibly indicated by the demonstrated ability to support many wives) passes on his genetic constitution to many offspring. 26
A modern instance of pqsitive eugenics is artificial insemination by
means of sperm and ova banks.27 In the case of sperm banks the
genetic endowment of a "desirable male" can be made available to a
woman desiring impregnation. Refinements of this procedure include
the services of a host mother for the initial stages of gestation (where
this is needed), or even the use of in vitro (test-tube) procedures, 28
with subsequent transfer of embryo to a properly prepared host
mother.
When eugenics is the context of these procedures, there are grounds
for uneasiness because the purported improvement of the race is so
substantially linked to the biological factors in good breeding. The
question begging to be asked is the guarantee for the role of the loving
union of the sexes in the act of procreating life. There is much less
difficulty with a properly therapeutic context for these measures,
where an individual couple, suffering from a problem of sterility or
the status as a defective gene carrier, and yet desiring a child to comFebruary, 1980
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plete their marriage, seeks the h elp of artificial insemination. In this
instance the primacy of the sexual act is not challenged as the normal
and normative way of "improving the race."

4. Cloning
For this reason the issue of cloning assumes a threatening posture.
Cloning is usually discussed in the context of positive eugenics. It
involves the surgical removal of the nucleus of a somatic cell (whet
from oneself or from another) and its substitution as the nucleus (
germ or egg cell (whose own nucleus has been surgically removed)
This is truly asexual (parthenogenosis) conception where a n ew creature
is developed which is the exact duplicate of its single parent. The
marvels of this still experimental procedure include a new kind of
immortality for the " parent" involved, and the mass production of
such "desirable" models as Einstein, Burt Reynolds, Jane Addams,
Raquel Welch, etc. 3D For all practical purposes, cloning is currently
restricted to frogs; but it is a distinct possibility for primates.
The ethical issues raised by cloning are obvious. Should the gene pool
be dominated by models characterized by strength, beauty, genius, intelligence? Of what is the race being deprived when the hereditary traits
of the less gifted are restricted? What will happen to the heralded
variety and adaptability - the secret to human survival thus far - if
the genetic base is so narrowed, even though so "enriched"? What
model or models of man /woman are to prevail in this attempt to
improve the species? And who is to determine this? But the most
serious issue of all is what might happen to human freedom and its
capacity for disposing of oneself should a deliberate narrowing of our
genetic stock occur?31 For our genetic constitution and our patterns
of conduct are reciprocally related. Whatever excellence to which we
have brought technological sophistication may suffer eclipse if the
kind of genius which accomplished this is inadvertently filtered out.
The future of our race ought not be so planned that complete predictability is secured. Surprise, as the spice of life, must remain an ingredient of the human subject.32 What would life be without it?
Such foreboding possibilities explain the lurking pessimism associated with genetic engineering, and the sense of impending disaster.
Survival of the species has become the watchword. 33 Indeed, we must
seriously ask whether we shall survive. Eugenics would assure u s that it
will save us through changing and improving us. But into what shall we
be changed? Will the survival we achieve be worthwhile? Christian
ethics can countenance only a certain kind of survival - of persons
who are genuinely human, with an improved capacity for loving,
caring, compassionate, passionate, strong and responsible behavior. 34
Not life at any price, but only a certain kind of life is worth living.
Indeed, life is not an absolute value, not even human life. Rather, it is
30

Linacre Quarterly

a relative value, esteemed and appreciated in virtue of its relation to
the values just mentioned. 35 It is with a view to such life that we
support the vision of the human person undergoing renewal by selfcreation. Any self-confidence we experience in this enterprise must be
sustained by an unfailing belief in a provident God guiding us into a
future that will be achieved at least as much by hope in Him as by
technological expertise. Hope is the supreme endowment we bequeath
future generations.
III. Theological Reflection on Eugenics

),

'. r

Theology speaks to our beginnings and our end in a way that lends
support to such hope. The biblical book of Genesis is a kind of theological genetics , as it describes the origins of human life from God's
perspective. In its analysis, life is a gift in which we participate, not
only receptively, but also pro creatively through sexual friendship and
parental love. This early version of the beginnings of life must never be
lost sight of in the midst of our highly complex disciplines of genetics
and eugenics. For we believe that something more than mythical
description is involved in the book of Genesis. It provides us with
God's own design for human life which should serve as a normative
standard for evaluating modern technological achievement such as
germ banks, in vitro fertilization, and cloning. 36 Asexual reproduction, for instance, were it ever to become "policy," would seem to
violate God's design for sexuality. However, if it were to be performed
on behalf of an individual unable to procreate in the normal fashion,
moral evaluation of it need not be so adverse . And were we to expand
the framework of these considerations to a catastrophic situation
where a genetic defect threatened the entire human race, then procedures of negative eugenics which would be out of the question
under normal circumstances might well be regarded as part of God's
design for the present. 37
1. Suffering

I

,

Theology also casts a special light on the human 38 suffering which is
often associated with a genetically caused condition. It is difficult to
assign any value whatsoever to suffering apart from the Christian faith,
which allows and even encourages us to interpret it as a medium of
relating with God . From a theological viewpoint, wholeness and health
are attainable through faith in God, even while the sufferings of disease still thwart the best medical efforts to overcome them. For suffering is relativized within a theological context, where its total meaning
is not absolutely identified with the moment at hand, but is sought in
the continuum of a life-process whose total meaning escapes any given
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moment, even the moment of death. It is only when we rest with God,
or lose Him once for all, that we are in a position to render a final
judgment on our sufferings.
2. God
When ethics works within the frame of reference furnished by
theology, it provides a special kind of guidance to what is morally
good and evil in eugenics. Such an ethics thinks of health and wholeness in terms of holiness, of a man's union with God. This link to God
is an imperative, to the extent that health and wholeness are. But,
more than that, it is the basis of hope: under God's aegis, man and
woman can "make" it. There is a new basis here for the dignity we
perceive in the human person. It is his/her link with God, and the
corresponding hope that He provides of improving our condition. In
this analysis, it is not a person's genetic endowment which is the basis
of his/her dignity and worth. 39 It is the human freedom to respond to
God's initiative on our behalf in the midst of technological accomplishments, empowering the human person to be the originating center
of his or her life.
3. Sin
Error, even costly mistakes, indeed sin itself, are compatible with
this vision of the human person, even though they may dilute and
weaken our freedom .40 In the context of faith, these are " ailments,"
but they have their remedies: the catharsis of conversion, the recuperating period of penance, and finally regained health (wholeness and
holiness) through grace. This is the theological model of the human
person, seeing him/her as one called to an ever-expanding relationship
with God. Spiritual health, or salvation, consists of openness to the
action of God. The only catastrophe that can befall this design is best
described as "death" (mortal sin). When this definitive and irreversible condition ensues, it effectively closes the human person in upon
him or herself, narrowing his or her capacity of adjustability to the
point of complete inaction.

4. Conflict between Models
When this theological model assumes its place among the other
models of humanness, it can compete in the public forum with them.
Hopefully, it will be competent to challenge any model that claims to
explain our origins and our destiny. The genetic/eugenic model cannot
totally explain the dehumanization accompanying certain modes of
human existence. Another vision must be brought to bear upon the
human person, in which the powers of the human mind and heart are
uncovered and the capacity for justice, love and mercy are discovered.
These powers take on great significance when they are viewed in their
openness to the saving action of God. This is the kind of vision that
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the Christian appeals to in "programming" the future of the race. It
casts a new hue on those individuals otherwise branded as carriers of
genetic disease, and qualifies judgments brought to bear upon them by
geneticists to the effect that they are the causes of the evils afflicting
the species. The qualification consists of an enlarged view of just what
this "evil" really is: is it not more than genetic deficiency in offspring?
Does it not consist in the hatreds, prejudices and injustices of the
human heart? Nonetheless, no responsible couple can blithely ignore
evil in any of its forms and manifestations. When they are enabled to
obviate their condition as carriers of genetic disease, they have a moral
obligation to do so.
The great evil, in this age of concern over the quality of our common gene pool, is to lose our respect for the new life unfortunately
begotten in a defective condition. The abortion climate surrounding us
today makes it extremely difficult to maintain this respect, while at
the same time honestly confronting the conflict such a life entails for
its parents, as it competes with and possibly threatens other values to
which they are committed. 41
IV. The Medical Profession

r

Neither eugenics nor genetics is medicine. 42 Medicine does not
primarily purport to improve the prognosis of the human race. Its
primary purpose is to heal, or prevent, the sickness of an individual.
Though good medicine aims at preventing disease, in practice it is
largely occupied with healing those already sick. In the growing discussion today abo~t the social dimensions of medicine, much of it is
justifiably critical of this excessively individualistic tum to medical
practice in this country. To the extent that the many are penalized for
the advantage of the few, this criticism is well grounded, but even in
the vision of reformers, social medicine is good medicine precisely
because it reaches every individual in the country.
1. Professionalism
It is this prominence of the commitment to individual welfare that
makes medicine a profession. The relationship between medical personnel and patient is interpersonal, and pivots around a transaction in
which a service is rendered and a fee is paid, though often the fee is
not commensurate to the service given. 43 The atmosphere surrounding this relationship is designed to be one of respect, trust and confidentiality.
In this context, medicine does not appear to be a power affecting
the future as much as a response to a present situation, enabling the
patient to achieve the level of wholeness and health available to him or
her. Good medicine is at its best when it activates the latent recuperative powers within the sick person.
February, 1980
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2. Principles
A double principle guides the medical profession: to do no harm to
the patient, and to do him or her good. 44 It is the negative mode of
this statement that evokes more unanimity than the positive part, for
there is greater room for disagreement over the kind or amount of
health to promote. Nonetheless, on the strength of the popularity it
enjoys in our society today, medicine is beginning to export into
public consciousness images of human well-being that approximate
therapeutic models. This development elicits the same question that
was posed to instances of eugenic influence: what kind of "say" ought
medicine to have about the components making for the good, happy,
whole person? 45 In the last analysis, such models of humanness are not
to be left entirely to the medical sciences.
V. Personal Qualities of Medicine
Certain medical concerns rightfully emerge into prominence in this
context. Prominent among these is the professional relationship
already spoken of. This relationship enjoys a quality that mediates the
tendency toward confrontation which characterizes the theological
and genetic/eugenic models of man. For the professional medical
relationship is not simply a contractual exchange of things; it is a
covenantal transaction of a personal nature. The values at stake are
not only those of justice, where a carefully measured transfer insures
equality in the exchange. There are values involved that cannot be
accurately measured: life and death, health and sickness, well-being
and suffering. 46 The medical person relates to these kinds of values as
they subsist in the individual patient, not in humankind at large. 47 It
is not a question of the numbers of people sharing in these values that
explains their significance. Rather, it is a question of the individual
human person who explains why health, well-being and life are to be
valued.
Medical service is a profession precisely because it proposes to
respond to the personal quality of a relationship. No professional
attribute facilitates this task more than compassion, for compassion is
an affective experience that enables one person to share and enter into
the suffering of another. 48 It consists of "feeling with" another.
Largely preconceptual, it is not adequately expressed by words. For a
medical person, it is an indispensable endowment.

;

VI. Compassion
Suffering is the medium of compassion. Often compassion is the
only medium wherein suffering can achieve value. Where suffering and
pain tend to turn a person "in" on himself or herself, compassion
opens up that person, in that self-same suffering, to another who feels
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with him or her. In this way suffering takes on meaning; it becomes a
way of reaching outward to someone else who cares about the suffering person.
Compassion is a desirable quality in medical personnel because, in
sensitizing them to the patient's suffering, it illuminates them about
aspects of discomfort that often escape other modes of detection. A
compassionate nurse, for instance, is an unusually effective agent to
care, comfort and even cure the patient, for she can discern what the
less compassionate, though technically competent, fail to see.
The compassionate person humanizes the situation of sickness by
supplying an element which serves to make the patient whole and
integral again. Health is wholeness; sickness is broken existence. The
various models of humanness out of which we operate determine, in
large part, our appreciation of what is whole and what is broken. In
the professional model just described, compassion looms large before
the experience of suffering because it supplies a sense of wholeness by
relating the patient to the medical professional. The wholeness in
question is not merely bodily integrity; by way of a personal relationship a new level of integrity is available to each person. In response to
the common experience of the sick person to mourn his or her diminished mode of existence, and to undergo a lessened sense of self-worth
and esteem, compassion moves in to fill that sense of loss with a
relationship, enabling the sick person to become whole again.
When we bring faith to bear on this professional transaction, the
ultimately compassionate person becomes God. Suffering becomes the
medium through which He enters our lives and unites with us. With
Him come salvation and health, for He is Savior. He brings total healing in a new dimension, for it occurs at the level of sin. Medical
personnel who, with the patient, operate within this context of faith,
legitimately interpret their activity in much the same way. They
herald the "good news" that God is at hand to save us . When their
compassion is influenced by faith, their professional commitment to
the patient achieves its ultimate perfection.
Compassion is a power in its own right, a power that heals, a
primary ingredient in an environment that actualizes the sick and/or
defective person to a new realization of health and wholeness. 49
Compassion redeems the present time, even though it be one of suffering and pain. It refuses to allow the present time to be dismissed as
useless or, at best, as a mere stepping stone to a better future. Compassion appreciates the present time and condition for itself. The compassionate medical p~rson is the sick and defective person's path to a
sense of worth and dignity, in himself or herself, without reference to
any better future or any improved condition of the race. This is a
worthy endowment to pass on to succeeding generations. Any genetic
engineering that can help promote this achievement is a power deserving to be utilized.
February, 1980
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33 . Cf. the remarks to this effect of Isaac Asimov and John R. Platt, ibid., pp.
97 and 100-101; Gustafson also supports this emphasis in Hilton , op. cit., p . 104,
and p. 109.
34. Similar descriptions of the "normatively human " are provided by Gustafson in Williams, op. cit., p. 50.
35. Among Catholic moralists , Richard A. McCormick articulated this position
in "To Save or Let Die," America, July 13, 1974. Walter G. Muelder formulates
this idea in the context of life as a developing process in his "Introduction" to
Williams, op. cit., p. 9.
36. Ramsey presents the traditional Christian view on the role and meaning of
sexual intercourse, op cit., pp. 32 , 130.
37. In this connection the great flood of the time of Noah (Genesis, chap.
6-10) represents, in the perspective of faith, a kind of "negative eugenics," to the
extent this calamity was viewed as a divine purification of sin-infected humankind .
38. Cf. the provocative remarks in this regard of O. Hobart Mowrer, Th e Crisis
in Psychiatry and Religion (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co. , 1961), chap . 5.
39 . Gustafson voices similar convictions in commenting that "religious thinkers
have claimed revelation as a warrant for their understanding of the normatively
human." And again: "In Christian theology there developed the notion that the
nature of ' true manhood' was revealed by God in Jesus Christ," in Williams, op.
cit., p. 53.
40. Karl Rahner acknowledges this in his paper, "Experiment: Man," Th eology
Digest, Sesquicentennial Issue, Feb., 1968, pp. 57-69.
4l. Richard Wasserstrom sensitively describes this problematic in his "The
Status of the Fetus, " in Th e Hastings Center Report, vol. 5, no. 3 (June, 1975),
pp. 18-22.
42. Cf. the exchange of Lejeune and Steinberg on the role of medicine in
natural selection in Hilton, op. cit., p. 19; and Gustafson's precautionary remarks
about utiliz ing eugenic arguments in making moral judgments, ibid. , p. 109 .
43. Szasz, Thomas S., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, (New York: Basic Books,
1974), presents some very cogent arguments to explain the role of the fee in the
context of psychoanalysis, especially in chap. 2 and 7.
44. Cf. the Hippocratic Oath: "The regimen I shall adopt shall be for the
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benefit of my patients according to my ability and judgment and not for t h eir
hu rt or for any wrong," in The Encyclop edia Brittallica, vol. 11: 827.
45. This is the burden of Gustafson's essay on "Genetic Engineering a nd the
Normative View of the Hum an," in Williams, op. cit., pp. 46 ff.
46. Cf. Jam es N. Lapsley, Salvation and Health : the Interlock ing Processes of
Life (Philadep hia, Pa.: The Westminster Press, 1972), especiall y chap. II.
47. Code for N urses with Interpretive Statements (New York: American
Nurses' Association), provides very h elp ful guidelines for the nurse -pati ent relationship , along these lines , as when it directs:
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status .. .
4. The nurse acts to safeguard the p atien t when his care and sa fety are
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6. The nurse participates in research activ ities when assure d t h at t h e
rights of ind ividual subjects are protected.
48 . Cf. W. G. McGown, "Compassion," in C. F. H. Henry, ed ., Baker's Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Gran d Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book Hou se, 197 3), p. 119.
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